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Entering the new year of 2014 the Kingdom of Tonga had 
enough to worry about; a local economy choking to near death 
and a finance minister sacked and replaced in a political 
spectacle leaving the public baffled over what went wrong 
between him and the Prime Minister (Fayle, 2014; Lopeti, 
2014c; Fonua, 2014b).  People uttered they looked forward to 
the end of year election tentatively set for Thursday November 
27th.  The 2010 register of around forty thousand voters had 
increased at the 2014 intake by four thousand, mostly voters 
who had turned the age of suffrage at twenty one years old.  
The chorus call from the masses was simple, vote them out.  
Then Cyclone Ian struck on Saturday 11 January 2014 
aggravating Tonga’s money shortage. 
Journalist Pesi Fonua wrote “the impact on the Tongan 
economy of the cyclone and the salary rise for civil servants at 
this point of time is a matter of great concern” (Fonua, 2014a).  
He was right.  The state and taxpayers could not afford 
economic recovery from Tonga’s cruellest cyclone, a symptom 
of climate change, let alone paying for a 5% rise in the cost of 
living allowance for public servants.  As the national debt 
distress sore became inflamed the Public Service Association 
decided it was the right time to fight cabinet for a 22% living 
allowance rise because 5% was not enough (Lopeti, 2014a).  
This essay asks a pointed question.  Leading up to the general 
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election of November 2014, how was cyclone politicking being 
manoeuvred to sway the way people would vote? 
 
 
Tonga disaster politics 
Cyclone Ian was rated at category 5, the severest tropical 
storm.  Tonga’s northern group Vava’u got battered around 
and bruised in a few places.  In between Vava’u and the main 
island of Tongapatu lay Ha’apai, a group of 51 atolls with a 
total population of 6,616 which copped the rough end of the 
stick (Statistics Department of Tonga, 2013).  Brutally bashed 
from the harshest climate hiding ever to hit Tonga, 1,094 
homes and buildings on six islands spread across eighteen 
villages collapsed.  North-eastern Ha’apai was described as 
“completely destroyed” with one cyclone-related death and 
fourteen others suffering minor injuries (‘Aho, 2014; Television 
New Zealand, 2014b; Television Tonga, 2014c; United Nations, 
2014b). 
It was estimated that 2,335 Ha’apai people were left homeless 
and up to 5,000 were affected by a varying scale of loss of 
assets, livelihood, and quality of life (Braddock, 2014).  A 
United Nations situation report projected that “950 farming 
households” were “in need of [humanitarian] assistance” 
(United Nations, 2014a).  Nine days after the cyclone wreaked 
havoc, the Tongan government put out the call for 
international humanitarian assistance confessing it did not 
have “local expertise or resources” to cope on its own (Baines, 
2014b; Radio Australia, 2014; United Nations Information 
Centre, 2014; World Bank, 2014a).  
One lesson stood out from Cyclone Ian smashing into a dozen 
and a half villages on six of Tonga’s low-lying atolls on the 
Saturday afternoon of January 11th 2014.  Natural and 
political disaster can travel a volatile course hand-in-hand 
(Brown Pulu, 2013).  On this matter, the stormy government 
to government relations between Tonga and New Zealand 
predetermined three political factors.  Firstly, how the New 
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Zealand government argued it could not help Ha’apai cyclone 
victims until the Tongan government asked for their help.  
Secondly, the nine day length of time that the Tongan state 
took to organise an initial request for outside assistance 
(Television New Zealand, 2014a).  Notable here was the 
ambivalent manner in which Prime Minister Lord Tu’ivakano 
and Deputy Prime Minister Samiu Vaipulu officially asked New 
Zealand for help (Radio New Zealand, 2014d; Television Tonga, 
2014j, 2014k, 2014l). 
Contrastingly, a month after the cyclone stuck Ha’apai, 
Tonga’s deputy prime minister appealed outright to China for 
a cash donation to rebuild 17 damaged schools which were no 
longer useable.  There was a striking political factor which 
became evident.  Once the Tongan government’s post-cyclone 
recovery plan headed by Samiu Vaipulu was given the green 
light at cabinet, the requests for monetary donations to rebuild 
Ha’apai housing and state infrastructure were manifold, 
costly, and levelled at China for the simple reason that Tonga 
and China’s bilateral agreements held greater economic 
dependency than the present New Zealand relationship. 
Put simply, China could be relied on to give a straight-cash 
donation for a national disaster operation with no conditions 
on how and where Tonga were to spend the gifted money 
(Brant, 2014; Matangi Tonga Online, 2014b; Television Tonga, 
2014c, 2014d).  New Zealand came at assistance from the 
opposite angle and could be expected to give goods and 
technical expertise, rather than money, with a list of 
stipulations on what they demanded in return from Tonga. 
 
What we are seeking now is assistance from the donor 
partners to build transitional and permanent 
classrooms.  We are targeting to request China for this 
assistance, but whoever will step in first to pledge their 
support, we will accept it.  Government will be paying 
the fees of Ha’apai students and students from Ha’apai 
whom are studying here in Tonga.  The sum will be 
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paid by government emergency fund.  World Bank also 
questioned the amount of money reserved in our 
emergency relief fund and I told them that people’s 
needs which cannot be provided [for] due to the natural 
disaster, we’ll use this money for it.  We will use this 
amount but at the same time, we will look at ways to 
return that amount to the emergency relief fund (Samiu 
Vaipulu cited in Television Tonga, 2014d). 
 
Thirdly and perhaps most significant, the politicking set-off by 
cyclone disaster led to a shifting alliance between Tonga’s 
deputy prime minister Samiu Vaipulu and the New Zealand 
foreign minister Murrary McCully.  Their association was not 
necessarily based on political alignment or economic 
dependency, but rather, a relationship of convenience coupled 
with the acquainted circumstance of playing traditional roles 
of the superior Western donor and an inferior Native recipient. 
Compounded by the fact that it was an election year in Tonga 
and New Zealand, McCully and Vaipulu manoeuvred around a 
multi-donor relief and recovery operation laced with a 
campaigning tactic.  To separate out the politicians’ 
electioneering from disaster management was difficult, and the 
question of whether the Tongan government’s desire to rebuild 
800 permanent homes destroyed by Cyclone Ian was feasible 
was never convincingly answered. 
At a glance, the deputy prime minister looked as if he was 
Tonga’s prime minister.  Samiu Vaipulu headed the National 
Emergency Management Office (NEMO) under his Ministry of 
Infrastructure with a capped budget of under $6 million 
Tongan pa’anga.  He gave the official interviews for Radio and 
Television Tonga news.  He signed donor agreements for 
recovery and rebuilding.  He accepted public donations 
deposited to a Westpac account managed by the Ministry of 
Finance and National Planning.  Lastly, he took control of 
what the government would and would not ship free of charge 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
66 
to Ha’apai as part of the national effort, and importantly, how 
the limited national relief fund would be spent. 
Releasing the Government of Tonga’s ambitious plan to collect 
$59.7 million pa’anga or USD $32.8 million American dollars 
from aid donors and banks to rebuild 800 temporary and 
permanent homes, Vaipulu stated that “if we have to borrow 
money then we would have to do that.  But if it’s for the sake 
of the people, I’d rather do it.” (Pulu, 2014; Pacific Eye 
Witness, 2014).  The likelihood that Tonga might take out a 
bank loan to rebuild two sets of housing, one transitional 
shelter and one permanent house for 800 properties, was fast 
becoming grim reality. 
The World Bank in Sydney upped the numbers estimating a 
complete rebuild at USD $50 million while donating USD $1 
million to repair the Ha’apai port, roads, and airport under an 
existing bilateral Tongan Government and Australian 
Government transport sector project.  Money for housing as a 
“possible area of support” was the statement given by World 
Bank country director for the Pacific Islands, Franz Drees-
Gross.  However, this did not amount to a definite yes, the 
World Bank would meet the total sum Tonga wanted up front 
for 800 x 2 cyclone resistant abodes, which Vaipulu 
commented would be a temporary one standing alongside a 
permanent house (World Bank, 2014a; Television Tonga, 
2014a). 
The temporary abode which the Tongan government wanted to 
construct over a three month period was what the World Bank 
and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs politely nodded to in official 
communication.  But to fork out for the entire gamut including 
800 permanent homes at a total cost of $59.7 million pa’anga, 
which Tonga’s cabinet hoped to build in eighteen months on 
money the ministers assumed developed countries might give 
to them, sounded like pie-in-the-sky talk. 
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I hope the government can build 50 houses and the rest 
of the 750 houses will wait for assistance from donor 
partners.  The World Bank had agreed to cover the cost 
of 70 per cent of the transitional houses for Ha’apai 
residents.  The remaining 30 per cent of the cost will 
depend on the Tongan government.  After the work on 
temporary houses we continue on to permanent houses 
which will stand next to the temporary houses.  The 
temporary houses will be built under the same plan 
and size and they will make sure that it can withstand 
future cyclones. (Samiu Vaipulu cited in Television 
Tonga, 2014a). 
 
New Zealand’s foreign minister Murray McCully called Samiu 
Vaipulu’s estimate of $59.7 million Tongan pa’anga 
“frightening,” signalling his government was not altogether 
eager to pay the full price Tonga was pleading for (Pacific Eye 
Witness, 2014).  McCully had put NZD $1.4 million of New 
Zealand’s total cyclone assistance totalling at NZD $2.27 
million into repairing the Ha’apai electricity network (New 
Zealand Government, 2014a; Matangi Tonga Online, 2014d).  
A calculated decision on the New Zealand Government’s part, 
McCully promoted his energy portfolio. 
During his term as Foreign Minister, he pushed New Zealand’s 
state-owned company Meridian Energy for building solar 
farms in Tonga and the Pacific Islands.  It had become his 
political strategy for marketing New Zealand companies to the 
region.  Deploying Tongan “line mechanics” from Northpower 
Limited to work in Ha’apai as well as supplying generators and 
technical equipment meant cash payment for New Zealand 
companies (Northpower, 2014). 
By no means did McCully’s aid package straightforwardly 
amount to New Zealand aid providing income to the Tongan 
state-owned enterprise Tonga Power Limited or creating work 
for local businesses, suppliers, and technicians.  In the aid 
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business, New Zealand’s fundamental interest was to 
safeguard its own economy. 
What was the Tongan state’s motive for publicly advocating a 
complete rebuild above and beyond the range and reach of its 
national budget?  An outdated urban-drift ideology leaked out 
of the deputy prime minister’s brainchild.  By Samiu Vaipulu’s 
rationale it was plainly undesirable to have Ha’apai cyclone 
refugees migrate to the main island of Tongatapu.  Expressly, 
the overcrowded urban sprawl of Tonga’s capital Nuku’alofa 
with squatter settlements of outer islanders growing in 
number on the eastern and western borders posed an urban 
development dilemma for town planning (Ewart, 2014). 
Nuku’alofa had a land and housing shortage as well as 
sewage, waste management, water, flooding, and youth 
unemployment stressors for the state bureaucracy to contend 
with (Maclellan, 2014).  A sharp population increase would 
turn up the resource pressure valve to high.  But an irony 
prevailed in the sense that Tonga’s deputy prime minister had 
been a people’s representative for an outer island constituency 
of the Vava’u group for twenty five years. 
Unwittingly, Vaipulu demarcated a social boundary.  There 
were outer islanders like himself who were allowed to 
internally migrate to Tongatapu and gain access to land, state 
resources, and employment.  Then there were others of a 
different class and kind who were denied the choice of internal 
migration by a Tongan state directive insisting they be 
confined to the nation’s outliers (Dornan, 2014). 
 
We want to ensure that the people of Ha’apai stay there 
and do not come to Tongatapu.  We want to rebuild 
their homes and also the economy.  Cabinet has 
approved the rehabilitation plan for the people of 
Ha’apai.  We see that there is a need to have temporary 
shelter, which will be built first then the permanent 
homes, which we hope to have completed within 18 
months.  We do not want to see a repeat of what 
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happened in the Niuas.  We will be talking with donor 
governments and agencies to help us rebuild Ha’apai. 
(Tora, 2014). 
   
In sobering detail, Samiu Vaipulu seemed quite prepared to 
deliberately increase national debt to over the sovereign 
threshold of 50% GDP, which meant an incoming government 
might inherit a new debt legacy come November 2014.  This 
raised the alarm as to whether the Tu’ivakano government had 
carefully considered that financially the move nailed the lid on 
the coffin of Tonga’s new administration, whomever that might 
be, before they even started work.  Who does that?  Only in 
Tonga was the response from overseas Tongan spectators, a 
derogative slur indicating the speaker was rolling their eyes in 
disbelief at the flippancy of how the math was calculated and 
the numbers thrown out for public backers. 
The Tu’ivakano cabinet’s four-year stint as a more 
democratically elected government had left an unpleasant 
taste.  Tongans in diaspora grew painfully aware that the 
homeland state floundered in crisis management redeploying 
from one disaster initiative to the next.  Worse still, the Prime 
Minister had become infamous for reshuffling cabinet 
ministers and their portfolios like a deck of cards with a 
gambler’s expectation that miraculously Tonga would get dealt 
the winning hand.  Exerting short-term thinking that 
insufficiently grasped the long-term consequences of panicky 
ad hoc solutions was the government of the day’s trademark.  
This government, it was said, survived hand-to-mouth and 
week-to-week with little consistency at balancing the books 




Aid breeds dependency 
If there was an origin moment when the mentality of aid 
dependency weighed down by bank loan debt got put into 
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words then Samiu Vaipulu was the architect for the 
Tu’ivakano government (Andreou, 2014).  Self-assuredly he 
declared in local and international media that he was all for 
both, aid and loans.  Speaking to Karen Magnall of Radio New 
Zealand in May 2012, one month after the death of King 
George Tupou V and the assent to the throne of his youngest 
brother King Tupou VI, the deputy prime minister was 
definitely not mourning the country’s bank loan debt to the 
EXIM Bank of China.  The Vaipulu mentality was that Tonga 
is “not in debt.”  Rather, “Tonga is highly developing” (Magnall, 
2012).  
 
We don’t have money to develop our economy so that in 
the future we don’t always have to ask New Zealand 
and Australia for money.  I’m not afraid saying that 
Tonga is highly in debt.  I say, it’s not in debt.  Tonga is 
highly developing. (Magnall, 2012). 
 
Another Vaipulu interview went down on media record a year 
later at the July 2013 regional gathering in Nadi, Fiji, of the 
Pacific Platform for Disaster Risk Management and the Pacific 
Climate Change Roundtable (Gero et al, 2013).  The deputy 
prime minister gave his opinion on why he wanted an 
amalgamated ministry between Environment and Climate 
Change which was under Lord Ma’afu and his own National 
Emergency Management Office and the Tonga Meteorological 
Service.  He could get “more funding, aid and help.”  
Unmistakably this was “for the benefit of the country and its 
people;” that is, acquiring extra money from donors, bank 
grants, or from wherever this Tongan ministry which conflated 
climate with disaster could get the dollar figure they desired. 
 
Vaipulu says three days of dialogue at the Joint 
Meeting of the 2013 Pacific Platform for Disaster Risk 
Management and Pacific Climate Change Roundtable in 
Fiji, he is contemplating the merger of the Environment, 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
71 
Climate Change, Tonga Meteorological and National 
Emergency Office into one ministry.  Vaipulu says he 
will raise this proposal with the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.  “My reason to merge these divisions is to be 
able to gain more funding, aid and help.  If these 
divisions are merged they could be able to work more 
closely together for the benefit of the country and its 
people,” says Vaipulu. (Secretariat of the Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme, 2013). 
 
Vaipulu’s disaster legacy had an effect on the human psyche 
of Tongan government bureaucrats.  The National Reserve 
Bank’s newly appointed governor, Dr Ngongo Kioa, was 
anticipating “economic growth” to GDP (gross domestic 
product); millions of dollars pouring into Tonga from the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, New Zealand Aid, 
Australian Aid, US Aid, and China.  Cyclone assistance was 
arguably Tonga’s biggest money-maker by way that the 
“reconstruction” work in the Ha’apai islands would, in theory, 
remunerate public servants as well as private sector 
companies and suppliers.  Money in large quantities coming 
into the country “would stimulate growth,” and that was the 
extent of the Reserve Bank governor’s calculation and 
comprehension (Matangi Tonga Online, 2014a). 
Measuring the social cost of destruction to wellbeing and 
livelihood caused by the cyclone in Ha’apai did not figure in 
the governor’s GDP equation.  He was about measuring real 
“growth,” not the emotional kind that glues kinfolk, villages, 
and small low-lying islands together for three thousand years 
of human settlement history in Tonga (Matangi Tonga Online, 
2014a).  Local histories of outer islanders and the attachments 
they formed to their people and place of belonging was not 
valuable social capital in the government method of building 
community resilience to climate change. 
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Cyclone Ian could be a blessing in disguise for Tonga’s 
struggling economy, with the Reserve Bank now 
predicting an economic stimulation from the inflow of 
new development assistance.  Dr Ngongo Kioa, the new 
Governor of Tonga’s National Reserve Bank, said this 
week that he expected that the multi-million dollars 
assistance pledged by donors for the reconstruction of 
Ha’apai would stimulate Tonga’s economic growth and 
increase the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Speaking 
on the “State of the Tongan Economy” to members of 
the Tonga Chamber of Commerce on Monday February 
24, Ngongo said that the irony of the situation was that 
a growth burst of the Tongan economy takes place 
during reconstruction after a major destruction. 
(Matangi Tonga Online, 2014a). 
 
A colleague wrote me from Tongatapu with observations from 
Tongans living on the main island of the national relief 
operation in Ha’apai.  The insights here were noted before the 
deputy prime minister announced the government would move 
into the recovery phase of appealing for donations to rebuild 
800 x 2 temporary and permanent houses.  One critical 
reflection shone like a light: “They see help no longer as a gift 
but a right.” 
Referring to Ha’apai cyclone victims, the speaker positioned 
local people in the present political climate of Tonga’s aid-
driven economy.  By this, aid, assistance, donations, and the 
labour of others was perceived to be a form of entitlement that 
people duly expected as their “right,” prerogative, and 
privilege.  “Post-traumatic” stress was not counted out as a 
factor determining the dispiritedness of Ha’apai locals in being 
unmotivated to “clean up or work on their properties.” 
(Anonymous Informant 1, 2014; Matangi Tonga Online, 
2014c).  However, this does not detract from the discussant’s 
main emphasis: aid in the small island developing state of 
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Tonga was now understood as a right, which held similar 
importance to a constitutionally guaranteed civil freedom. 
 
The locals are not as involved in the clean up of their 
own places as they are leaving the clean up to people 
from the outside, the army, volunteers from Tongatapu, 
and from overseas.  In fact if the locals were involved in 
the clean up, most of the rubbish would have been 
cleaned up by now.  People are sitting around waiting 
for help, and very few are doing any clean up or work 
on their properties.  This is so unlike Ha’apai people, 
but maybe they have changed.  They see help no longer 
as a gift but a right.  [Volunteers] are doing what the 
locals should be doing.  The locals in the meantime are 
sitting around waiting for the tokoni [help].  I have 
heard it from different sources that this is a major issue 
observed by the visiting volunteers.  The Free 
Wesleyans sent a team of faifekaus [ministers] to visit 
the affected areas, and they came back and announced 
that the Ha’apai affected people need counselling.  I 
guess post-traumatic counselling.  They may be right. 
(Anonymous Informant 1, 2014). 
 
How far had the aid is entitlement syndrome infiltrated 
Tongan psychology?  Undoubtedly the penetration was deep 
and multiplying in fertile conditions.  John Pulu, a Tongan 
journalist for Television New Zealand’s weekly show Tagata 
Pasifika, reported a Ha’apai update six-weeks after Cyclone 
Ian.  Interview excerpts from Ha’apai women and men 
exemplified the emotional damage of having worldly 
possessions and homes smashed to pieces by natural disaster.  
Also evident was an unrealistic social expectation that the 
Tongan government and foreign donors would automatically 
rebuild homes for no cost to the consumer because this is 
what the locals considered they had a right to be given. 
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I think maybe more than five or ten years to fix the 
house unless the government help us to build the 
house. (‘Alisi ‘Akau cited in Pulu, 2014). 
 
We urgently need help right now so we can go back to 
our homes because the tents can’t fit all our belongings. 
(Tevita Hiliau cited in Pulu, 2014). 
 
Whatever entitlement people figured they deserved to 
compensate for their loss, the deputy prime minister was in 
the driver’s seat, an authority of all state decisions on the 
Ha’apai situation (Television Tonga, 2014f).  The destination 
he was driving the government to and dragging the country 
behind stirred a serious question.  The answer, however, was 
evident in how Tonga’s post-cyclone politics fell trap to an aid 
dependency mind-set fashioned by Samiu Vaipulu.  Lord 
Tu’ivakano, the outgoing prime minister and an older 
generation noble came across hesitant and indecisive perched 
on the edge of a cyclone politicking led by Vaipulu.  If 
anything, the Tongan public perceived the prime minister as 
going along for the ride of disaster business strategised by his 
deputy prime minister (Government of Tonga, 2014e). 
 
 
Bureaucracy of humanitarian assistance 
Back in New Zealand, Labour Party leader David Cunliffe was 
the opposition in the House.  He thought that straight after 
Cyclone Ian struck the New Zealand government had offered 
“poor” humanitarian assistance to Tonga.  Cunliffe scoffed that 
there was “an insufficient response to the cyclone crisis in 
Tonga.”  One cash donation to the Tongan government of 
NZD$50,000 plus sending an RNZAF Orien to photograph the 
ground damage did not cut it.  He was thinking around the 
one million dollar mark was reasonable in light that “Tonga is 
struggling to cope with the disaster and thousands of people in 
the Ha’apai island group are still displaced” (Radio New 
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Zealand, 2014g).  Why not a million cash up-front with no 
NZAID strings attached so the Government of Tonga was free 
to do as they wanted with the money according to their 
national disaster management plan and how they assessed 
their own people’s needs? 
Five days later, Tonga’s deputy prime minister Samiu Vaipulu 
went through the New Zealand High Commission in 
Nuku’alofa, Tonga to formally ask for relief supplies.  NZAID 
responded within 48 hours by creating a fund based at its 
Wellington headquarters valued at NZD $300,00.  There was a 
catch; only New Zealand non-government organisations such 
as Oxfam New Zealand and Red Cross New Zealand could bid 
for the cash to give out water and emergency kits in Ha’apai.  
On top of this, NZRAF flew to the main island of Tongatapu 
delivering evacuation tents, water, and some tools such as 
chainsaws and hammers on a Hercules C-130 considered too 
big to land directly on the Ha’apai airstrip.  The supplies were 
then shipped from Nuku’alofa to Pangai wharf, adding an extra 
day to travel time. 
Mana, a minority political party agreed with Labour.  John 
Minto, a Mana candidate for Auckland edged the argument 
further by calling the National government’s minimal response 
“an embarrassment” to New Zealanders (Minto, 2014; 
McCulloch, 2014).  National’s Minister of Pacific Island Affairs, 
Peseta Sam Lotu-Iiga, came back at Labour and Mana 
accusing them of playing politics and trying to score popularity 
points with voters (McCulloch, 2014).  In the midst of Tonga’s 
post-cyclone operation, Lotu-lIga was made the National 
Party’s first Samoan Minister of Pacific Island Affairs (Ministry 
of Pacific Island Affairs, 2014).  It appeared the New Zealand 
government was also guilty of appealing to Pacific voters to 
kick off an election year of campaigning for power (Ministry of 
Pacific Island Affairs, 2014).  Loto-Iiga had been appointed a 
minister by his party leader, New Zealand’s Prime Minister 
John Key.  Curiously, he stood outside of cabinet as the 
Minister of Pacific Island Affairs, which triggered criticism from 
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Samoans in New Zealand that he was a token appointment, a 
puppet politician without voice and decision-making power 
inside his own cabinet (Kaniva Pacific, 2014). 
 
 
The public meeting to recruit a committee of volunteers to 
organise relief containers of food and water for Ha’apai 
cyclone victims at Lotofale’ia Methodist Church in 
Mangere, South Auckland. 
 
On the evening of Tuesday January 14 at Lotofale’ia Methodist 
Church in Mangere, South Auckland, a public meeting was 
attended by approximately 50 women and men who were 
predominantly Tongan migrants with blood ties to the Ha’apai 
group.  The purpose was to recruit volunteers for a Ha’apai 
Relief Committee tasked with collecting and packing relief 
goods in 20 feet containers donated by three shipping 
companies Pacific Direct Line, Matson, and Polynesian 
Shipping Line were transporting the freight from the Port of 
Auckland to the Port of Nuku’alofa on Tonga’s main island free 
of charge.  Drinking water, non-perishable food, pots, pans, 
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and cutlery would go directly to families living on six cyclone 
effected islands across 18 villages.  The displaced population 
who were homeless numbered at 2,335 people with a total of 
5,000 people affected by cyclone damage to homes, properties, 
churches, shops, as well as public infrastructure such as 
roads, schools and the one hospital that served the Ha’apai 
group. 
The front seats of the public meeting couched a political mix of 
National, Labour, and Mana Party representatives, along with 
Pacific members of the Auckland Mayoral Disaster Fund and 
one Palangi (white/European) reverend of the Anglican 
Church.  These officials, either employed by the state or 
church clergy, were set up as the important speakers with 
each given a time-slot to address to audience.  Seated behind 
them were the ordinary Tongans expected to fill up 44 gallon 
drums of donated goods named explicitly for their Ha’apai 
kinfolk. 
From its inception, it was not clearly communicated if the 
relief effort was only for Ha’apai donors living in Auckland, or 
if food and water was also being collected from Tongans who 
had no blood tie to Ha’apai as well as the wider New Zealand 
public who were non-Tongan.  The message was confusing and 
social media employed to mobilise support and gather 
donations, such as the Facebook page of the Ha’apai Relief 
Committee, looked and read like a charity drive exclusively for 
and by Ha’apai people.  Understandably given this was an 
emergency exercise in collecting relief freight for cyclone 
victims, the core group targeted as donors were Auckland-
based families with kinship connections to, or land and 
property holdings in, the six affected Ha’apai islands.  
Shipping relief containers by a family to family system where 
Auckland Tongans packed and named freight expressly for 
their kinfolk affected by natural disaster in Tonga had been 
done before.  In 2002 when Cyclone Waka battered the Vava’u 
group, Auckland Tongans organised shipments of food and 
water by a family to family system, and again in 2009 when a 
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tsunami hit Niuatoputapu, an island which at the time had a 
population of 934 people in Tonga’s northern group.  However, 
this time it was different by a heightened bureaucratisation of 
how humanitarian assistance crossed Tonga’s border. 
Although Cyclone Ian collected one life compared to the nine 
who died in Niuatoputopu’s 2009 tsunami, it had wreaked the 
worst damage in Tonga’s hurricane history to homes, 
buildings, boats, subsistence crops, and the state 
infrastructure of water, power and roads.  The Ministry of 
Lands and Environment office based in Ha’apai estimated it 
would take ten years for the natural environment, particularly 
forestation and foreshores, to rejuvenate.  Understandably, the 
amount of relief containers and the speed in which the 
senders wanted their freight to reach Ha’apai was greater than 
that of previous donations. 
With this, came a social expectation that the New Zealand 
government and the Tongan government would work side-by-
side to foot the bill for customs tax and port dockage in Tonga, 
transhipping costs from Tongatapu to Ha’apai, and the 
handling and distribution of goods to Ha’apai families.  But 
the relief system of Tonga’s National Emergency Management 
Office was not straightforward. 
Natural disaster preparedness plans of South Pacific nations 
and the responses of aid donor countries alongside 
humanitarian and monetary organisations and banks such as 
the United Nations, the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, were highly 
bureaucratised institutions.  Local governments were 
integrated into international structures and processes.  
Climate change reinforced thick layers of red-tape in 
requesting international assistance and getting it to the 
Tongan state which in turn accounted for, checked, recorded 
what they got, and redistributed goods to village recipients. 
Containers of relief donated by Auckland Tongans got tangled 
up in tape.  A trouble-free transfer of goods from an overseas 
community to homeland recipients did not take place.  
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Instead, overseas donations were subjected to a governmental 
web of getting permission all the way up the state hierarchy; 
permission to get inside the Port of Nuku’alofa on Tonga’s 
main island and further to Ha’apai by a domestic shipping 
route of 100 kilometres up the ocean highway (Australian 
Network News, 2014b).  Three of the ten containers sent by 
Auckland Tongans were repacked and transhipped to Ha’apai 
from the Port of Nuku’alofa on Friday 7th of March.  Staff from 
Pacific Forum Line’s Tonga office volunteered the handling 
labour free-of-charge, and on the week of Monday 10th of 
March the goods were offloaded to Ha’apai families at Pangai 
wharf.  A month to reach its destination was “too slow” by 
local opinion (Pulu, 2014). 
 
I think it’s too slow because we already get the 
donation from churches.  I think the government, they 
are the first one to stand up and help their people, their 
country. (Siutaisa Tonga’onevai cited in Pulu, 2014). 
 
The primacy of international stakeholders drove the 
bureaucratisation of national disaster management in the 
Pacific Islands and the way that humanitarian assistance from 
governments and inter-government organisations officially 
entered a developing country.  Developed countries were 
protecting themselves against legal claims for loss and 
damage.  By this, the World Bank bragged about awarding 
“the first Pacific catastrophic insurance payout [of USD $1.27 
million] to Tonga to help the country recover from Cyclone Ian” 
(Australia Network News, 2014).  But this was an insurance 
company cough-up that Tonga had paid for as part of a pilot 
scheme for Pacific Island nations (Australian Network News, 
2014a; Baines, 2014a; Government of Tonga, 2014d; World 
Bank, 2014b). 
Under no uncertain means did an insurance policy entertain 
the dangerous idea that a small poor country like Tonga 
should, and could, use international law to sue the world’s 
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biggest polluter countries for the loss and damage they had 
inflicted on small island developing states.  Why would they?  
The logic here was that small island developing states got 
enough of a settlement plus humanitarian aid to maintain 
their complacency over litigating for climate damages.  But 
how did such high-level scheming impact on overseas 
communities and their charity donations? 
In an interview with Radio Australia’s Bruce Hill, Melino Maka, 
chair of the Tongan Advisory Council in Auckland, New 
Zealand, spoke candidly (Hill, 2014a, 2014d).  He criticised the 
Tongan government’s National Emergency Management Office 
headed by the deputy prime minister for charging distribution 
costs on four containers out of ten donated by New Zealanders 
to Ha’apai cyclone victims.  Filled with non-perishable food 
and water, six containers were transferred by the Tongan state 
from the Port of Nuku’alofa to Pangai free-of-charge.  The last 
four collected a fee of around TOP $2,000 which the Ha’apai 
Relief Committee, a group of volunteers without funds to draw 
on was instructed to pay. 
Maka’s argument was based on principle.  Given the container 
contents were charity and the senders of the cyclone 
assistance unpaid volunteers, why would the Government of 
Tonga bill them for vital supplies needed to supplement the 
national relief effort?  Lusia Latu, a Tongan national living and 
working in Tonga posted an incisive commentary on my 
Facebook page which echoed and evoked Melino Maka’s 
sentiments. 
 
How can a government make money out of charity, out 
of the genuine giving of their own people for love, out of 
generosity for our people – Tonga people for Tonga 
people?  It is already costing those GIVERS money to 
purchase, donate, and having to ship them to Ha’apai.  
OK, that’s cool but you GIVERS also have to pay us for 
simply just watching you doing great things for Tonga.  
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Now pay or no containers – to atu ‘etau ngaue 
pule’anga ee – classic act! (Latu, 2014). 
 
Short play: Scene 1: New Zealand Tongans versus Tongan 
government 
Bruce Hill: Now this is the Tonga government is 
actually asking you, the Tongans in 
New Zealand, to pay not only for the 
containers full of goods but to actually 
pay for their distribution? 
Melino Maka:  Yes, yes.  But we have our own 
committee members on the ground 
helping with the distribution of food 
that we’ve already sent there with 
those six containers.  But I think they 
were talking about the last four 
containers. 
Bruce Hill: Are you in a financial position to be 
able to pay for the distribution of these 
goods that you’ve donated as well? 
Melino Maka: I don’t think it’s the issue about 
financial position because the 
committee don’t have any money.  But 
it’s the issue that it’s a personal view, I 
feel that we actually committed to the 
whole thing from the outset and the 
idea that we, my belief that it’s a 
partnership between New Zealand and 
Tonga and with the community.  But to 
ask the community to try to front up 
with money, I think it’s a bit hard to 
follow.  This is my own perspective.  
This is the first time in all the years 
that I [have been] involved in relief that 
I’ve been asked to actually pay for the 
stuff that we organised from this end. 
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Bruce Hill: Why do you think the Tongan 
government made that request from 
you? 
Melino Maka: Oh I think it’s a reality now that they 
are really pressed for resources and 
the only way to do is to ask us to help 
out which is fine on one hand, but I 
think the principle of it, you know.  We 
don’t have money.  We actually have 
committed a huge amount of our time 
to coordinate this relief effort. (Melino 
Maka cited in Bruce Hill, 2014a). 
 
 
Disaster is an electioneering strategy  
Some New Zealand academics were quick to interpret the real 
politick at play. Pakeha (white/European) sociologist Scott 
Hamilton did not hold fire: New Zealand government was 
straight-up stingy.  This was not without rich country 
justification as to why Tonga, a poor country neighbour got the 
cold shoulder.  Tonga’s attention on China as its closest friend 
and development partner turned New Zealand icy.  Hamilton 
thought New Zealand’s foreign minister Murray McCully was 
still sore with Tonga’s deputy prime minister Samiu Vaipulu 
getting his government a gifted plane from China (Hamilton, 
2014).  The problem with Vaipulu’s plane was that it put 
Tonga’s domestic flight service, a New Zealand company called 
Chathams Pacific, out of business.  Chathams said it could 
not compete with a Tongan government plane flown by a 
Tongan company, and so packed up and went home, 
complaining it was hard done by. 
Of course McCully retaliated because he could.  He held the 
NZAID purse strings.  It made minimal difference if the New 
Zealand government was led by National or Labour because an 
established relationship pattern had gelled with the Tongan 
government.  New Zealand was the traditional donor and 
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Tonga was the indebted recipient.  But the Tu’ivakano regime, 
where the Prime Minister of Tonga himself was the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, had turned into an ungrateful beneficiary of a 
traditional arrangement by getting into bed with China and 
practically breaking off the engagement with New Zealand. 
McCully’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade issued a travel 
advisory for New Zealanders on transport safety in Tonga 
(Radio New Zealand, 2013a, 2013b).  The New Zealand 
government warning against the Chinese aircraft gifted to the 
Tongan government rang loud and clear (New Zealand 
Government, 2013). 
 
Tonga’s domestic airline fleet currently includes an MA-
60 aircraft.  This aircraft has been involved in a 
significant number of accidents in the last few years.  
The MA-60 is not certified to fly in New Zealand or other 
comparable jurisdictions and would not be allowed to 
do so without a thorough certification process under 
Civil Aviation rules.  Travellers utilising the MA-60 do so 
at their own risk. (New Zealand Government, 2013). 
 
The upshot to all of this was that New Zealand travellers to 
Tonga intending to fly on the domestic airline could not readily 
get health and travel insurance with holiday packages.  
Insurers withdrew their customer service predicting the MA-60 
aircraft gifted from China posed a burdensome business risk.  
The straw that broke the camel’s back, however, was 
McCully’s suspension of NZAID funding promised to the 
Tongan government to build the tourism sector into a regional 
competitor (Arrow, 2013; Hill, 2014).  An aid dependent 
economy with a fledgling tourism industry that relied on New 
Zealand travellers as staple income, the double loss of NZAID’s 
monetary injection and tourists was crippling.  Tonga tourism 
virtually fell over (Radio New Zealand, 2014b). 
Adding weight to a broke economy stressed by cyclone 
recovery was the fact it was an election year for both 
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countries.  The New Zealand and Tongan governments were on 
their way out, but not without a no holds barred mentality to 
how they did business.  Bluntly, the Prime Minister Tu’ivakano 
and Deputy Prime Minister Vaipulu did as they pleased with 
Tonga’s affairs, often recklessly and without thought as to how 
their impulsive decisions would cripple the country financially 
and politically long after they had been voted out of office.  
And McCully appeared to fall trap to their tactics, reacting like 
an old colonial administrator from the era of Empire set on 
disciplining and punishing the Natives into model behaviour 
as subordinates to New Zealand by his imperialist standards 
(Radio New Zealand, 2014a). 
In the midst of Tonga’s 2014 hurricane season a change of 
events blew in.  New Zealand ex-patriate Shane Walker, a 
tourism operator in Vava’u and board member of the Tonga 
Tourism Authority, made a startling comment to Radio New 
Zealand journalist, Alex Perrottet.  Walker suggested that a 
deal had been cut between the governments of New Zealand 
and Tonga (Radio New Zealand, 2014a, 2014b).  They were to 
settle the dispute over the safety of the MA60 aircraft that 
China had gifted Tonga by a mediator.  The International Civil 
Aviation Organisation was involved in “a [safety] certification 
process … that’s acceptable to New Zealand.”  Indeed this was 
“good news for Tonga,” stated Walker; his voice showing 
optimism that his own tourism trade in Vava’u would be back 
in business. (Perrottet, 2014).  
 
I was told recently, as late as Friday [21 February 
2014] last week by some New Zealand Government 
officials that ICAO, the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, has been looking closely at it.  And I can’t 
verify this exactly but reading between the lines, it’s my 
understanding that everyone has agreed to do the work 
required to appease New Zealand’s concerns and we’re 
optimistic that a certification process will be put in place 
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that’s acceptable to New Zealand, so it should be good 
news for Tonga. (Shane Walker cited in Perrottet, 2014). 
 
Walker’s claim was immediately dropped by the official 
government-to-government circle.  McCully declined to 
comment for New Zealand, and the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation felt “it wouldn’t be appropriate for it to get 
involved in a long-standing dispute between Tonga and New 
Zealand.” (Radio New Zealand International, 2014a).    
 
An international civil aviation group says it wouldn’t be 
appropriate for it to get involved in a long-standing 
dispute between Tonga and New Zealand.  A member 
of Tonga’s Tourism Authority, Shane Walker, says he 
was told the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
may have stepped in to solve the stand-off, but the 
organisation has distanced itself from the comments. 
(Radio New Zealand International, 2014a). 
 
Most bewildering was the Government of Tonga’s denunciation 
of Radio New Zealand for running a series of three news items 
unravelling Walker’s assertion that a MA60 aircraft safety 
arrangement had been agreed to (Tonga Daily News, 2014).  
Deputy Prime Minister Samiu Vaipulu took to Television Tonga 
News on the evening of February 26th to put across his side of 
a tangled story.  “I didn’t realise he would make these terrible 
lies on the news,” scorned Vaipulu, rebuking Alex Perrottet, 
the Radio New Zealand journalist who interviewed Shane 
Walker and pursued the story further by calling the deputy 
prime minister for a comment. 
The truth was Shane Walker had speculated to media that 
Tonga was now in tow with New Zealand not the journalist, 
and Vaipulu was not necessarily discrediting his discussion as 
falsehood.  What riled Tonga’s deputy prime minister was the 
reporting angle where New Zealand’s public broadcaster 
claimed that “Samiu Vaipulu has been adamant he won’t ask 
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a New Zealand technician to accredit the plane because it 
would offend the Chinese donors” (Radio New Zealand, 2014b). 
Reporting consistency was perceptible in Radio New Zealand’s 
archive.  On July 11th 2013, an interview excerpt from Murray 
McCully was broadcasted and published where New Zealand’s 
foreign minister stated explicitly that “I’ve been offering to fund 
aviation safety expertise to go to Tonga [but] that’s not an offer 
they had been prepared to accept” (Radio New Zealand, 
2013b).  Vaipulu’s retort published a couple of weeks later on 
July 25th was that “New Zealand should take any issues it has 
with the safety of the aircraft to China, not Tonga” (Radio New 
Zealand, 2013a).  
 
SAMIU VAIPULU: The most simple thing is for McCully 
to contact the government of China and ask them if it is 
a faulty airplane.  Why would they give it as a gift to 
Tonga?  We have built our billboards, we have started 
our TV programmes in New Zealand – we’re not 
stopping. 
Murray McCully says Tonga has rejected an offer to 
help with safety issues and Mr Vaipulu has been 
pushing to get the Chinese plane. 
MURRAY MCCULLY: I’ve been offering to fund aviation 
safety expertise to go to Tonga if that would assist in 
dealing with the issue.  That’s not an offer they had 
been prepared to accept, so we are really in their 
hands. (Radio New Zealand, 2013b). 
 
Samiu Vaipulu says New Zealand should take any 
issues it has with the safety of the aircraft to China, not 
to Tonga.  He says he is not worried about the 
suspension of [eight million US dollars] funding, saying 
it mainly affects New Zealand business people trying to 
sell their goods in Tonga. (Radio New Zealand, 2013a). 
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A political driver was put into words from Vaipulu’s outburst 
on Television Tonga News.  The scuffle between him and 
McCully transpiring almost a year ago over the China gifted 
MA60 aircraft had shifted to a diplomatic patch-up between 
the New Zealand and Tongan governments.  For what reasons, 
Tonga’s deputy prime minister was not willing to discuss 
publicly, saying that “it’s something that we [Mcully and I] 
agreed that we won’t go into the media until we get things 
done.”   
What he did reveal was that a secret squirrel sign-off had 
taken place between the Government of Tonga and the New 
Zealand High Commissioner to Tonga, Mark Talbot.  “McCully 
has kept his word,” exclaimed Vaipulu on Tongan public 
television.  He had “released part of the funds” from the USD 
$8 million dollar aid package to Tonga’s tourism industry, 
which previously he withheld due to what McCully originally 
maintained was an unsafe Chinese aircraft posing a risk to 
New Zealand tourists flying domestically from Tongatapu to 
the outer islands. 
Why was a New Zealand Aid deal done on the sly by the High 
Commission to Tonga without an official press release by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade informing New Zealand 
taxpayers of where, how, and for what purpose had the state’s 
money been spent on foreign aid?  For a former settler colony 
of the British Empire with a large indigenous Maori and Pacific 
Islander population that politically asserted itself as a 
paternalistic neighbour to Pacific Island states, what is the 
point of preaching on democratic institutions to Tonga when 
the very principles of public transparency and accountability 
are not practiced by the New Zealand government?  What did 
Vaipulu mean by saying he and McCully “won’t go into the 
media until we get things done.”  What “things” and why 
secretive? 
 
Kalolaine Tongalava: Tonga did not oppose a New Zealand 
expert from inspecting the MA60 
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aircraft, according to information 
released on Radio New Zealand 
International or RNZI this morning.  
This was confirmed to Radio Tonga 
News by the Honourable Deputy Prime 
Minister who is also the Minister for 
Infrastructure, Samiu Vaipulu. 
Anasiu Falekaono: The Honourable Deputy Prime Minister 
Samiu Vaipulu told Radio and 
Television Tonga this morning that the 
information released on Radio New 
Zealand International [is] untrue.  This 
is [in] regard to the issue of assistance 
[from] New Zealand worth eight million 
US dollars. 
Samiu Vaipulu: No, there was no such comment from 
me.  They called me from Radio New 
Zealand International, and I told them 
that I had a gentleman’s agreement 
with Honourable Murray McCully and 
I’ll respect that agreement, and I’m not 
giving anything to the media.  Maybe 
they can call me in two or three weeks’ 
time; maybe by then we have done 
something.  But any other comments 
they made is false. 
Anasiu Falekaono: Meanwhile, the Honourable Deputy 
Prime Minister says he has not given 
out any information to Radio New 
Zealand International regarding the 
MA60 aircraft issue. 
Samiu Vaipulu:  It’s something that we agreed that we 
won’t go into the media until we get 
things done.  However, he has 
released part of the funds and it’s 
already been signed between the 
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[Tongan] government and the [New 
Zealand] High Commissioner here.  So 
McCully has kept his word and I don’t 
know what the media is trying to do.  
And I am still keeping my word.  I’m 
not releasing anything until I talk with 
Mr McCully again.  It is with due 
respect, the media should stay and 
report things according to what’s been 
said, instead of trying to make 
problems between countries.  Even the 
person that called me yesterday, I’m 
sorry I forgot his name, because I 
didn’t realise that he would make 
these terrible lies on the news. 
Anasiu Falekaono: [The] Honourable Deputy Prime 
Minister believes inaccurate 
information may mislead the public’s 
attention and affect the diplomatic 
relationship between the Tongan 
government with its foreign 
counterpart. (Samiu Vaipulu cited in 
Television Tonga, 2014a).   
 
There were traces of an electioneering strategy in Murray 
McCully’s turnaround on retracting the USD $8 million 
promised to Tonga’s tourism industry.  Samiu Vaipulu had 
made a pertinent point: New Zealand’s withdrawal of aid 
“mainly affects New Zealand business people trying to seek 
their goods in Tonga” (Radio New Zealand, 2013a). 
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New Zealand foreign minister Murray McCully shaking 
hands with Tonga prime minister Lord Tu’ivakano at the 
prime minister’s office in Nuku’alofa.  Photograph by the 
Ministry of Information and Communications, 
Government of Tonga. 
Shane Walker was one of a cluster of New Zealand ex-patriates 
who had set themselves up as tourism operators in Tonga.  
The local industry was dominated by New Zealand business 
people, all Pakeha (white/European).  Moreover, the newly 
appointed general manager of Tonga Tourism Authority Stuart 
Perry was an older generation white Australian male 
(Government of Tonga, 2014a).  How could small Tongan 
businesses compete equitably in a tourism sector where white 
foreigners constituted the authority? 
It was not singly the aftermath of a category 5 cyclone in 
Ha’apai that prompted McCully to have a change-of-heart over 
his China aircraft disgruntlement.  Rather, the New Zealand 
Foreign Minister was carefully campaigning towards an 
October election in which his government of two terms, 
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amounting to six years, was not convincingly picked at the 
polls to win.  Vaipulu operated under a similar circumstance. 
He assured Ha’apai cyclone victims there would be a complete 
rebuild of 800 permanent homes in eighteen months; not that 
his government had the money in hand, but none-the-less, it 
was priming up to be a November election of donor pledges 
and politicians’ promises.  Consequently, the row about the 
China aircraft got toned down because making up and 
remaining on friendly terms with the neighbour was more 
politically expedient than brawling over the fence. 
Radio New Zealand’s contention that “Samiu Vaipulu has been 
adamant he won’t ask a New Zealand technician to accredit 
the plane because it would offend the Chinese donors” was 
sidestepped by Vaipulu (Radio New Zealand, 2014b).  Apart 
from commenting to Television Tonga that “Tonga did not 
oppose a New Zealand expert from inspecting the MA60 
aircraft,” the China question remained unanswered.  Would 
China be offended at the way Tonga conducted back-room 
business by getting Murray McCully to release “part of the 
[USD $8 million] funds” he had withdrawn in exchange for a 
safety certification arrangement that appeased the New 
Zealand government? (Television Tonga, 2014a). 
Observably, the electioneering strategies of these New Zealand 
and Tongan government ministers converged to capitalise on 
disaster.  Here, McCully and Vaipulu played out an old donor 
and recipient scene where New Zealand came to poor Tonga’s 
rescue and answered requests for help as their closest 
developed country neighbour.  During the New Zealand foreign 
minister’s two-day visit to Nuku’alofa from January 31st to 
February 1st, he discussed disaster relief efforts as well as the 
Tonga and New Zealand joint commitment for development 
authorised by the New Zealand Aid programme (Government of 
Tonga, 2014b; New Zealand Aid, 2011; New Zealand 
Government, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d).  A press 
conference was given by Samiu Vaipulu and Murray McCully 
at the National Emergency Management Office which focused 
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entirely on New Zealand’s assistance to the proposed Ha’apai 
rebuild (Government of Tonga, 2014a; New Zealand Aid, 2011). 
Tonga’s deputy prime minister wept on camera, wiping his 
tears with his handkerchief.  Overcome with emotion he 
expressed to McCully, the New Zealand government, and the 
New Zealand High Commissioner to Tonga, Mark Talbot, “You 
have been with us all along and it’s much appreciated” 
(Matangi Tonga, 2014d).  Television Tonga reported that 
McCully’s sentiments were clear-cut: “New Zealand will always 
be on Tonga’s side to provide any assistance needed” 
(Television Tonga, 2014e).  While Matangi Tonga published an 
excerpt from McCully’s speechmaking emphasising that the 
MA60 China aircraft skirmish was somewhat mended in light 
of urgency for Ha’apai’s cyclone recovery. 
 
The Deputy PM and I may have some different views on 
the best way forward there, but we are good friends 
and we are in constructive dialogue on the best long-
term arrangement for both the transport and marine 
safety here.  We haven’t really focused on that issue 
this trip as the immediate requirement is to focus on 
Ha’apai. (Murray McCully cited in Matangi Tonga, 
2014d). 
 
Tongan media had unambiguously read McCully’s dialogue in 
black-and-white with no shades of grey changeability.  By this, 
how easily could a New Zealand Aid package impose 
concessions on Tonga’s part, reversing their bilateral 
relationship with China back to favouring the West?  New 
Zealand’s foreign minister was taken to have made a very 
specific pledge; that is, the New Zealand government would be 
financially willing and able to bankroll the cash and goods 
required to help complete an eighteen month elaborate and 
costly plan to rebuild 800 x 2 temporary and permanent 
abodes in Ha’apai. 
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Was there any reason why his discussion might not be 
interpreted this way?  Tongans were desperate to have the 
uncertainty surrounding the living conditions for Ha’apai 
cyclone victims resolved by a definite vote of confidence that 
there was adequate money to rebuild 800 permanent homes 
and lives.  McCully was a seasoned politician.  Calculatingly 
he played to a captive audience of social anguish to win the 
advantage for the New Zealand government in being needed by 
Tonga.  Trapped in the neediness of a distraughtly poor 
country, Tonga’s bargaining power with New Zealand 
becoming immediately transformed into a characteristic South 
Pacific scene: the Native dependant and white paternalism, 
charity, and benevolence (Television Tonga, 2014g, 2014h). 
 
In terms of the cyclone recovery there are some things 
we can do within the existing programme, but I want to 
be quite clear the cyclone recovery funds will be on top 
of the funds normally committed to Tonga in the coming 
year. (Murray McCully cited in Matangi Tonga, 2014d). 
 
Considering that the New Zealand foreign minister’s visit and 
statements led the local media to believe he was 
unquestionably behind the Tongan government’s proposed 
rebuild, which was provisional and subject to funding or a 
bank loan, it was understandable that Television Tonga News 
had a slant they pitched to viewers.  McCully and New Zealand 
were the hero.  A government of predominantly white New 
Zealand men who upheld conservative-right politics had flown 
to Tonga’s side to save the day. 
 
Fatai Fainga’a: The Honourable New Zealand Foreign 
Minister Murray McCully is on a two-
day visit to Nuku’alofa to assist 
Tonga’s recovery activities in the 
Ha’apai group of islands.  While 
speaking to the media, one of the 
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issues raised was the reconstruction of 
permanent housing for the residents of 
Ha’apai. 
Murray McCully: The deputy prime minister’s just given 
me some very frightening figures in 
terms of the cost of reconstruction of 
houses.  That is obviously something 
that is going to require multi-donor 
effort and we’ll have some further 
discussions to work out how New 
Zealand can best contribute to that 
process. 
Fatai Fainga’a: The Foreign of New Zealand 
Honourable Minister Murray McCully 
also commended the hard work and 
good leadership role taken by the 
deputy prime minister Honourable 
Samiu Vaipulu, especially on helping 
those who were severely affected by 
the tropical Cyclone Ian in the Ha’apai 
group of islands.  He also elaborated 
that New Zealand will always be on 
Tonga’s side to provide any assistance 
needed. 
Murray McCully: People in New Zealand watched very 
closely as the cyclone struck Ha’apai.  
In fact, it was so slow there was 
intense interest in the build-up and 
track of the cyclone.  And so we were 
able to send an Orien P3 to do quick 
reconnaissance work but we’ve been 
in good communication with the 
Tongan government to do what we can 
to render assistance, and now we’re 
focused very much on the recovery.  
We’ve been impressed in New Zealand 
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to see strong and firm leadership as is 
always required in these difficult 
situations.  We are very keen to be of 
assistance. (Murrary McCully cited in 
Television Tonga, 2014e). 
 
In the storyline Television Tonga invented an interlude of quite 
significant considerations by Samiu Vaipulu was downplayed.  
Here, the deputy prime minister admitted at the press 
conference with McCully that this is “what we [cabinet] are 
thinking of doing” (Television Tonga, 2014e; Tora, 2014).  
There was no definite plan set in stone with verifiable funding 
to rebuild two sets of 800 temporary and permanent homes for 
Ha’apai cyclone victims at all.  In reality cabinet had accepted 
aspirational ideas that it hoped to pursue if the recommended 
rebuild was in any way financially achievable (Radio New 
Zealand, 2014c; Television Tonga, 2014b).  Whether it would 
get done according to plan was by no means unequivocally 
known. 
 
We need the people of Ha’apai to move from tents to 
some kind of temporary [shelter] during that transitional 
period [which] would be three months.  That’s what we 
are thinking of doing and for permanent houses maybe 
eighteen months from now. (Samiu Vaipulu cited in 
Television Tonga, 2014e). 
 
 
Silencing the opposition 
From the opposition bench, the leader of Tonga’s Democratic 
Party ‘Akilisi Pohiva had an axe to grind about the Tongan 
government’s disaster performance.  At seventy two years old, 
Pohiva was campaigning for prime minister after failing to 
secure the head of government job the first time around at the 
2010 election.  In an interview with Radio Australia’s Bruce 
Hill, he condemned the state’s post-cyclone effort early on in 
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the piece for not showing “New Zealand and Australia” equal 
amounts of gratitude for their relief donation compared to the 
big fuss made over China (Hill, 2014b, 2014c; Government of 
Tonga, 2014f, 2014g; Prime Minister’s Office, 2014; Lopeti, 
2014b). 
China had only arrived on “the scene … maybe 10 years ago,” 
said Pohiva.  Scathingly he thought “it’s shameful” behaviour 
on Tonga’s part because the “Commonwealth countries” were 
Tonga’s enduring friends (Hill, 2014b).  Pohiva made it no 
secret that his loyalty was to the old-guard Commonwealth 
countries of New Zealand and Australia.  In turn, these 
countries were strategic allies to the United States of America.  
New Zealand and Australia assumed responsibility for policing 
the South Pacific to ensure Oceania stayed a Western sphere 
of influence.  This was the West’s method for averting China 
from spreading its economic and military influence across the 
Asia Pacific region and challenging America’s primacy. 
 
It’s shameful for Tonga to behave in such a way 
because New Zealand and Australia and also 
Commonwealth countries have been working very 
closely for Tonga for so long.  With China, [it] just came 
in very late to the scene.  I recall that maybe 10 years 
ago, or a little bit more than 10 years ago, Tonga goes 
down its diplomatic relations with Taiwan and adopted 
a new policy which is known in Tonga as look [to the] 
east policy which simply means China.  That is the 
situation now. (Hill, 2014b). 
 
On Radio New Zealand, Pohiva took a second swipe at 
discrediting Vaipulu’s National Emergency Management Office.  
This time it was the nine day length of time the Tongan 
government took to organise an official request for assistance 
from aid donor countries and inter-government organisations 
such as the United Nations Development Programme. 
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The whole purpose of having an emergency office is to 
act immediately after the disaster.  But the government 
has been very reluctant to come in.  And that really 
shows how inefficient and ineffective the government 
are in carrying out their duties to the public. (Radio New 
Zealand, 2014f). 
 
Samiu Vaipulu hammered a blunt point.  If the truth be 
known, ‘Akilisi Pohiva was originally from Ha’ano Island which 
underwent extensive cyclone damage.  At the time of his 
interview, Pohiva had not travelled to Ha’apai as part of the 
national emergency efforts carried out by government, 
churches, and non-government organisations.  Absent from 
frontline relief, Vaipulu made it known that Pohiva was in no 
position to make participant observation comments on the 
ground operation. 
 
The quickest response is from government.  We were 
there on Sunday with tents, everything.  I haven’t seen 
Mr Pohiva on the scene to criticise what government has 
done.  We have done our best and we’ve tried to cover 
the needs of the people. (Radio New Zealand, 2014e). 
 
To prod deeper, the people’s representative for Ha’apai 
constituency number 12, Mo’ale Finau, was a member of 
Pohiva’s Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands.  Finau had 
not spoken up publicly as an elected Ha’apai parliamentarian 
about the relief, recovery, and reconstruction needs of his 
electorate.  In July 2012, Mo’ale’s Democratic Party colleague 
for Ha’apai constituency number 13, ‘Uliti Uata, suffered a 
stroke and was hospitalised.  He had sought treatment 
overseas of which TOP $100,000 for his medical expenses was 
paid for by the legislative assembly’s budget.  Uata had not 
returned to the House leaving his electorate without a 
parliamentarian at work for almost two years (Matangi Tonga, 
2013). 
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In the end, the last word went to Tonga’s deputy prime 
minister.  Despite criticism against his government for electing 
to do research at the wrong time – putting together a damage 
report rather than dialling development partners for help – 
Vaipulu had a reply.  His retort was that the state had to 
assess “what was needed” specifically by way of humanitarian 
assistance before making the call to the outside world 
(Television Tonga, 2014i; Radio New Zealand, 2014c; 
Government of Tonga, 2014c).  Whether that was fair enough 
comment in respect that this was a category 5 cyclone, the 
worst of its kind, which the Tongan government tried to 
manage on its own for nine days was never thoroughly gauged.  
Vaipulu answered his critics with a tactless one-liner, the kind 
of reactive comeback he was publicly notorious for. 
 
Samiu Vaipulu says the government waited nine days 
to request international humanitarian help because it 
needed to assess what the needs were.  He says it did 
not want to abuse the trust of international 
development partners by asking for help when it did 
not know what was needed. (Radio New Zealand, 
2014e). 
 
And that was the last the public heard from the Democratic 
Party about their leader’s dissatisfaction with Samiu Vaipulu’s 
national operation in Ha’apai.  With the opposition effectively 
silenced by the deputy prime minister’s media retaliation it 
was perceivable that a contender for premier at the November 
ballot was Vaipulu as an alternative people’s representative to 
Pohiva.  At this stage in the 2014 election year, the 
parliamentary line-up for contesting the country’s leadership 
may not have gathered enough momentum and interest to 
switch from the past 2010 selection. 
The common people 
The final analysis of disaster politics goes to Tongan journalist 
and political commentator Kalafi Moala.  Would there be an 
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abrupt or unexpected change at Tonga’s 2014 general 
election?  Given the electoral registration increase of 4,000 
was predominantly twenty one year old voters and the average 
age for Tonga’s population of 104,941 was twenty one, could 
the younger generation instigate the 2014 political turn-
around that had been anticipated in 2010 but never quite 
happened?  Lastly, how would the financial anxiety caused by 
Cyclone Ian’s aftermath in Ha’apai sway the way people voted 
at the November poll?  A paradox emerged; the one election 
certainty Tonga faced was uncertainty itself. 
Moala was sure of one factor.  When it came to taking post-
cyclone action it was “the common people” who were the 
unsung heroes the Tongan state-owned media neglected to 
fairly pay attention to; not the authorities and foreign donors 
doing the diplomatic two-step in managing disastrous political 
relations (Menon, 2014).  But rather, the ordinary Tongans 
and their “incredible” generosity to give with no strings 
attached in spite of the over-bureaucratised hierarchy of hoops 
to jump through just to get containers of food and water 
distributed to Ha’apai families (Television Tonga, 2014m.  If 
that was the true South Pacific the Tonga Tourism Authority 
marketed as the Tonga brand, then hope lay ahead.  Perhaps 
this time in Tonga’s 21st century history, “the common people” 
would topple the predictably inconsolable politics which the 
public had grown accustomed to from four years of the 
Tu’ivakano administration, and indeed, vote them out (Moala, 
2014a, 2014b). 
 
I am picking up a group of Tongan registered nurses 
from Sydney tonight, with supplies, and they are flying 
out to Ha’apai in the morning to help.  My niece is 
among them.  I know of several groups of people from 
Tongatapu going over to help.  Just as much as we 
need supplies, we also need skilled manpower to help 
with construction. 
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I am impressed with the way people are helping: 
businesses, church to church, families to families, and 
just communities picking up and going over to lend a 
hand.  This is the biggest effort of relief assistance ever 
given here in Tonga and from the Tongan communities 
overseas, and we are getting there.  Things are getting 
restored, despite some of the hiccups which are 
expected, but the relief efforts cannot be defined by the 
failings of those in authority but rather by the incredible 
and self-sacrificial help given by the common people. 
(Moala, 2014). 
 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
101 
References 
‘Aho, L. (2014). Situation Report Number 4: National Emergency 
Coordination Centre (NEMO), Government of Tonga, Nuku’alofa, 
Tonga, January 14.  
 
Andreou, A. (2014). Trickle-down economics is the greatest broken 
promise of our lifetime. The Guardian, United Kingdom, January 




Anonymous Informant 1. (2014). Personal Correspondence to Teena 
Brown Pulu, Tonga, January 20. 
 
Arrow, B. (2013). Tonga loses NZ aid over use of suspect Chinese 
aircraft. Australian Network News, Melbourne, Australia, July 




Australia Network News. (2014a). Tonga receives $1.27m insurance 
payout for cyclone recovery: World Bank. Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation: Australia Network News, January 




Australia Network News. (2014b). Melino Maka cited in Tongan 
islanders taking stock after Cyclone Ian. Australian 





Baines, M. (2014a). Most without insurance in cyclone-hit Ha’apai. 
Radio New Zealand International: Dateline Pacific, Auckland, 




Baines, M. (2014b). Tongan Government officially calls for 
Humanitarian Aid. Radio New Zealand International: Dateline 





Braddock, J. (2014). Tonga cyclone leaves thousands homeless. World 
Socialist Web Site, USA, January 15. Retrieved from 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 




Brant, P. (2014). China’s humanitarian assistance: Signs of 
improvement? The Interpreter, Lowry Institute for International 




Brown Pulu, T. (2013). Climate Change Blues: Sustaining Village Life 
in Tonga. Te Kaharoa: The e-Journal on Indigenous Pacific Issues, 
6 (1): 260-305. 
 
Dornan, M. (2014). Access to Electricity in Small Island Developing 
States of the Pacific: Issues and Challenges. Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 31: 726-735. 
 
Ewart, R. (2014). SPREP to improve marine information library. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Radio Australia: 





Fayle, T. (2014). Tonga’s finance minister sacked after defying order to 
quit. Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Radio Australia: 






Fonua, P. (2014a). Challenges for Tonga’s more democratically elected 
government in 2014 election year. Matangi Tonga Online, 




Fonua, P. (2014b). Cabinet supports PM’s call for Finance Minister’s 
resignation. Matangi Tonga Online, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, January 




Gero, A., Fletcher, S., Rumsey, M., Thiessen, J., Kuruppu, N., 
Buchan, J., Daly, J. and Willetts, J. (2013). Disaster 
response and climate change in the Pacific. New South Wales,
 Australia: University of Technology Sydney, National Climate 
Change Adaptation Research Facility, Pp. 1-216. 
 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
103 
Government of Tonga. (2014a). Press release: Appointment of Mr 
Stuart Perry as the new General Manager for the Tonga 
Tourism Authority. Ministry of Commerce, Tourism and Labour, 





Government of Tonga. (2014b). Press release: New Zealand Foreign 
Minister pays first official visit for the year to the Kingdom of 
Tonga. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Nuku’alofa, 





Government of Tonga. (2014c). Press release: UN RC addressed 
Special Cabinet meeting; Government sends Appeal to 
donors for assistance after Cyclone Ian. Prime Minister’s 





Government of Tonga. (2014d). Press release: Cyclone Ian Triggers 
First Pacific Catastrophic Insurance Payout of USD$1.27 Million 
to Government of Tonga. Ministry of Finance and National 





Government of Tonga. (2014e). Press release: Tongan Prime Minister 
calls for international action – “Our oceans are the solution, not 
the problem.” Prime Minister’s Office, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 





Government of Tonga. (2014f). Press release: Government 
acknowledges Development Partners assistance during 
Cyclone Ian response and recovery process. Prime Minister’s 





Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
104 
Government of Tonga. (2014g). Press release: Government of the 
People’s Republic of China donates emergency supplies for 
Ha’apai. Prime Minister’s Office, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, January 




Hamilton, S. (2014). Letting down the family. Reading the Maps, 




Hill, B. (2014a). Tonga relief volunteers asked to pay for delivery. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Radio Australia: 




Hill, B. (2014b). Pro China policies may alienate overseas Pacific 
communities. Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Radio 






Hill, B. (2014c). Tonga opposition critical of government thanking only 
China for aid. Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Radio 






Hill, B. (2014d). Tongan Kiwis frustrated over Cyclone assistance. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Radio Australia: 




Kaniva Pacific. (2014). Pacific people say National out of touch. New 





Latu, L. (2014). Facebook post to Teena Brown Pulu, Nuku’alofa, 
Tonga, February 28. 
 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
105 
Lopeti, K. (2014a). PSA fights for 22% cost of living adjustment. New 





Lopeti, K. (2014b). Comment: Stop grovelling to the Chinese 
government. New Zealand Kaniva Pacific, Auckland, New 




Lopeti, K. (2014c). Tu’ivakano decision baffles the Opposition. New 





Magnall, K. (2012). Tonga – The Future. Radio New Zealand National: 
Insight, May 6. Retrieved from 
http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/insight/20120506 
 
Matangi Tonga Online. (2014a). Cyclone Ian a blessing in disguise for 





Matangi Tonga Online. (2014b). China gives $600,000 for cyclone 





Matangi Tonga Online. (2014c). Traumatized Ha’apai villages need 





Matangi Tonga Online. (2014d). NZ provides extra $370,000 for 
cyclone response. Matangi Tonga Online, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 




Maclellan, N. (2014). Climate Change is Wrecking the Pacific. 
newmatilda.com, New South Wales, Australia, January 14. 
Retrieved from 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 





McCulloch, C. (2014). Local Tongan community unhappy with NZ 
cyclone response. Radio New Zealand National: Morning 





Menon, M. (2014). Humanitarianism is as culpable as war. The Hindu, 




Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs. (2014). Welcome to the new Minister 
of Pacific Island Affairs. Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, 
New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand, 




Minto, J. (2014). Key government an embarrassment after cyclone in 





Moala, K. (2014a). Email Correspondence to Teena Brown Pulu, 
Tonga, January 20. 
 
Moala, K. (2014b). When hope is all you have left. Pacific Politics: 
Political news and analysis by the Pacific Institute of Public 
Policy, Port Vila, Vanuatu, January 24. Retrieved from 
http://pacificpolitics.com/2014/01/when-hope-is-all-you-have-left/ 
 
New Zealand Aid. (2011). New Zealand Aid Programme: Tonga – New 
Zealand Joint Commitment for Development. Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade: New Zealand Government, Wellington, New 
Zealand, July 13. Retrieved from 
http://www.aid.govt.nz/webfm_send/112 
 
New Zealand Government. (2014a). Murray McCully: Further Support 
for Tropical Ian Recovery. Beehive Govt NZ: The official 
website of the New Zealand Government, Wellington, New 




Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
107 
New Zealand Government. (2014b). Murray McCully: NZ provides 
further support to cyclone-hit Tonga. Beehive Govt NZ: The 
official website of the New Zealand Government, Wellington, 




New Zealand Government. (2014c). Murray McCully: More assistance 
to cyclone-hit Tonga. Beehive Govt NZ: The official website of the 
New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand, January 




New Zealand Government. (2014d). Murray McCully: Assistance to 
cyclone-hit Tonga. Beehive Govt NZ: The official website of the 
New Zealand Government, Wellington, New Zealand, January 
12. Retrieved from 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-assistance-cyclone-hit-tonga 
 
New Zealand Government. (2013). Safe Travel: Official advice for New 
Zealanders living and travelling overseas, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Wellington, New Zealand, December 24, 
Still Current. Retrieved from 
https://www.safetravel.govt.nz/tonga 
 
Northpower. (2014). Line Mechanics to Help in Tonga. Northpower, 
Auckland, New Zealand, January 24. Retrieved from 
http://northpower.com/news/entry/line_mechanics_to_help_in_tonga 
 
Pacific Eye Witness. (2014). Tonga’s Cyclone Response Plan Needs 
US$12.6 Million to Implement. Pacific Eye Witness, Auckland, 




Perrottet, A. (2014). Plane stand-off between Tonga and NZ may soon 
be solved. Radio New Zealand International: Dateline Pacific, 





Prime Minister’s Office. (2014). People’s Republic of China hands-over 
USD $600,000 for disaster relief, Prime Minister’s Office, 




Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
108 
 
Pulu, J. (2014). Ha’apai Rebuild. Tagata Pasifika, Television New 




Radio Australia. (2014). Tonga formally asks for international cyclone 
recovery assistance. Australian Broadcasting Commission: Radio 






Radio New Zealand. (2014a). ICAO says it has no role in Tonga/NZ 
MA60 controversy. Radio New Zealand International: 




Radio New Zealand. (2014b). International aviation body may solve 
Tonga-NZ stand-off over plane. Radio New Zealand 






Radio New Zealand. (2014c). Tonga cyclone recovery plan approved by 
Cabinet. Radio New Zealand International: Pacific, Auckland, 




Radio New Zealand. (2014d). More water and shelter needed in 
cyclone-hit Ha’apai in Tonga. Radio New Zealand International: 




Radio New Zealand. (2014e). Tongan govt refutes claim over slow 
cyclone reaction. Radio New Zealand International: Pacific, 





Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
109 
Radio New Zealand. (2014f). Tongan opposition critical of government 
cyclone response. Radio New Zealand International: Pacific, 





Radio New Zealand. (2014g). Govt Tonga response poor says Labour. 
Radio New Zealand News, Auckland, New Zealand, January 




Radio New Zealand. (2013a). Tonga’s MA60 aircraft to go into service 
next week. Radio New Zealand International: News, 





Radio New Zealand. (2013b). Safety concerns about Tonga’s new 
domestic aircraft. Radio New Zealand International: News, 




Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme. (2013). 
Tonga’s Deputy Prime Minister wants to merge climate and 
disaster functions. SPREP: Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 




Statistics Department Tonga. (2013). Tonga 2011 Census of 
Population and Housing, Volume 1: Basic Tables and 
Administrative Report, Statistics Department Tonga,
 Nuku’alofa, Tonga, Pp. 1-253. 
 
Television New Zealand. (2014a). Tonga asks for more NZ help in 
Cyclone Ian aftermath. TVNZ ONE News, Auckland, New Zealand, 




Television New Zealand. (2014b). UN report reveals extent of damage 
in Tonga. TVNZ ONE News, Auckland, New Zealand, January 
16. Retrieved from 
http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/un-report-reveals-extent-damage-in-
tonga-5801263 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 
Te  Kaharoa, vol. 7, 2014, ISSN 1178-6035 
110 
 
Television Tonga. (2014a). Samiu Vaipulu, Tonga did not oppose a 
New Zealand expert in Television Tonga News in English, Tonga 
Broadcasting Commission, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, February 26. 
 
Television Tonga. (2014b). Samiu Vaipulu, Hope for the Tongan 
government to start constructing transitional houses in 
Television Tonga News in English, Tonga Broadcasting




Television Tonga. (2014c). His Excellency Mr Huang Huagnuang cited 
in Television Tonga News in English, Tonga Broadcasting 




Television Tonga. (2014d). Samiu Vaipulu cited in Television Tonga 
News in English, Tonga Broadcasting Commission, 




Television Tonga. (2014e). Murray McCully, New Zealand continues to 
stand beside Tonga and assist in any way it can cited in 
Television Tonga News in English, Tonga Broadcasting 
Commission, Nuku’alofa, Tonga, January 31. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DKQMhtkFX2E 
 
Television Tonga. (2014f). Saimone Helu, CEO of Tonga Water Board 
cited in Television Tonga News in English, Tonga 





Television Tonga. (2014g). Murray McCully announces New Zealand to 
provide over $2 million pa’anga assistance cited in 
Television Tonga News in English, Tonga Broadcasting 




Television Tonga. (2014h). Special cabinet meeting approves 
reconstruction on homes cited in Television Tonga News in 
English, Tonga Broadcasting Commission, Nuku’alofa, 
Tonga. January 22. Retrieved from 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 





Television Tonga. (2014i). National Emergency Management Office 
survey cited in Television Tonga News in English, Tonga 





Television Tonga. (2014j). Mark Talbot cited in Television Tonga News 
in English. Tonga Broadcasting Commission, Nuku’alofa, 




Television Tonga. (2014k). Samiu Vaipulu cited in Television Tonga 
News in English. Tonga Broadcasting Commission, 




Television Tonga. (2014l). Samiu Vaipulu cited in Television Tonga 
News in English. Tonga Broadcasting Commission, 




Television Tonga. (2014m). Salote Heleta Lilo cited in Television Tonga 
News in English. Tonga Broadcasting Commission, 




Tonga Daily News. (2014). Acting PM says critical for right info to be 




Tora, I. (2014). Important to Have Ha’apai Rebuild: Vaipulu. Tonga 




Radio Australia. (2014). Tonga formally asks for international cyclone 
recovery assistance. Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Radio 
Australia International, Melbourne, Australia, January 22. 
Retrieved from 
Disaster Politics: Cyclone Politicking and  
Electioneering in the Kingdom of Tonga 






United Nations. (2014a). Tonga: Tropical Cyclone Ian Situation Report 
No. 5 (as of 5 February 2014). United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Regional Office for the 




United Nations. (2014b). Tonga: Tropical Cyclone Ian Situation Report 
No. 3 (as of 23 January 2014). United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Regional Office for the 
Pacific, Suva, Fiji, January 23. Retrieved from 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA_Tonga_
TCIan_Sitrep3_20140123.pdf 
   
United Nations Information Centre. (2014). Humanitarian Response to 
Cyclone Ian. United Nations Information Centre, Canberra, 




World Bank. (2014a). Press Release: World Bank Statement on 
Cyclone Ian Response. The World Bank: Working for a World 





World Bank. (2014b). Press Release: Tonga to Receive US $1.27 
Million Payout for Cyclone Response. The World Bank: 
Working for a World Free of Poverty, Sydney, Australia,






Page 10 Lotofale’ia, South Auckland, Photograph by Teena Brown 
Pulu. 
Page 19 Murray McCully and Lord Tu’ivakano, Photograph by 
Government of Tonga. 
 
